United Nations S/2000/587

Security Council

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Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 1234 (1999) of 9 April 1999, 1258 (1999) of 6 August 1999, 1265 (1999) of 17 September 1999, 1273 (1999) of 5 November 1999, 1279 (1999) of 30 November 1999, 1291 (2000) of 24 February 2000 and 1296 (2000) of 19 April 2000, and the statements of its President of 13 July 1998 (S/PRST/1998/20), 31 August 1998 (S/PRST/1998/26), 11 December 1998 (S/PRST/1998/36), 24 June 1999 (S/PRST/1999/17), 26 January 2000 (S/PRST/2000/2), 5 May 2000 (S/PRST/2000/15) and 2 June 2000 (S/PRST/2000/20),

Reaffirming the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Reaffirming also the obligation of all States to refrain from the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,

Reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and of all States in the region,

Reaffirming also the sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of the Congo over its natural resources, and *noting with concern* reports of the illegal exploitation of the country's assets and the potential consequences of these actions on security conditions and the continuation of hostilities,

In this regard, *calling on* all the parties to the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and others concerned to cooperate fully with the expert panel on the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/PRST/2000/20) in its investigation and visits in the region,

Expressing its deep concern at the continuation of the hostilities in the country,

Expressing in particular its outrage at renewed fighting between Ugandan and Rwandan forces in Kisangani, Democratic Republic of the Congo, which began on 5 June 2000, and at the failure of Uganda and Rwanda to comply with their commitment to cease hostilities and withdraw from Kisangani made in their joint statements of 8 May 2000 and of 15 May 2000 (S/2000/445), and *deploring* the loss

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of civilian lives, the threat to the civilian population and the damage to property inflicted by the forces of Uganda and Rwanda on the Congolese population,

Recalling its strong support for the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (S/1999/815) and insisting that all parties honour their obligations under that Agreement,

Deploring the delays in the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and the 8 April 2000 Kampala disengagement plan, and *stressing* the need for new momentum to ensure progress in the peace process,

Expressing its deep concern at the lack of cooperation of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo with the Facilitator of the National Dialogue designated with the assistance of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), including the fact that the delegates were prevented from attending the Cotonou preparatory meeting on 6 June 2000,

Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General of 13 June 2000 (S/2000/566),

Recalling the responsibility of all parties to the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo for ensuring the safety and security of United Nations and associated personnel throughout the country,

Welcoming the participation in its meetings on 15 and 16 June 2000 of the members of the Political Committee of the Ceasefire Agreement,

Expressing its serious concern over the humanitarian situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo mainly resulting from the conflict, and *stressing* the need for substantial humanitarian assistance to the Congolese population,

Expressing also its alarm at the dire consequences of the prolonged conflict for the security of the civilian population throughout the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and its deep concern at all violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law, in particular in the eastern part of the country, especially the Kivus and Kisangani,

Determining that the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Calls on* all parties to cease hostilities throughout the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and to fulfil their obligations under the Ceasefire Agreement and the relevant provisions of the 8 April 2000 Kampala disengagement plan;

2. *Reiterates* its unreserved condemnation of the fighting between Ugandan and Rwandan forces in Kisangani in violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and *demands* that these forces and those allied to them desist from further fighting;

3. *Demands* that Ugandan and Rwandan forces as well as forces of the Congolese armed opposition and other armed groups immediately and completely withdraw from Kisangani, and *calls on* all parties to the Ceasefire Agreement to respect the demilitarization of the city and its environs;

4. *Further demands*:

(a) that Uganda and Rwanda, which have violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, withdraw all their forces from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo without further delay, in conformity with the timetable of the Ceasefire Agreement and the 8 April 2000 Kampala disengagement plan;

(b) that each phase of withdrawal completed by Ugandan and Rwandan forces be reciprocated by the other parties in conformity with the same timetable;

(c) that all other foreign military presence and activity, direct and indirect, in the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo be brought to an end in conformity with the provisions of the Ceasefire Agreement;

5. In this context *demands* that all parties abstain from any offensive action during the process of disengagement and of withdrawal of foreign forces;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep under review arrangements for deployment of the personnel of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), as authorized and in conditions defined by resolution 1291 (2000), to monitor the cessation of hostilities, disengagement of forces and withdrawal of foreign forces as described in paragraphs 1 to 5 above and to assist in the planning of these tasks, and *requests also* the Secretary-General to recommend any adjustment that may become necessary in this regard;

7. *Calls on* all parties, in complying with paragraphs 1 to 5 above, to cooperate with the efforts of MONUC to monitor the cessation of hostilities, disengagement of forces and withdrawal of foreign forces;

8. *Demands* that the parties to the Ceasefire Agreement cooperate with the deployment of MONUC to the areas of operations deemed necessary by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, including by lifting restrictions on the freedom of movement of MONUC personnel and by ensuring their security;

9. *Calls on* all the Congolese Parties to engage fully in the National Dialogue process as provided for in the Ceasefire Agreement, and *calls in particular on* the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to reaffirm its full commitment to the National Dialogue, to honour its obligations in this respect and to cooperate with the Facilitator designated with the assistance of the OAU and to allow for the full participation of political opposition and civil society groups in the dialogue;

10. *Demands* that all parties cease all forms of assistance and cooperation with the armed groups referred to in Annex A, Chapter 9.1 of the Ceasefire Agreement;

11. *Welcomes* efforts made by the parties to engage in a dialogue on the question of disarmament, demobilization, resettlement and reintegration of members of all armed groups referred to in Annex A, Chapter 9.1 of the Ceasefire Agreement, and *urges* the parties, in particular the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Government of Rwanda, to continue these efforts in full cooperation;

12. *Demands* that all parties comply in particular with the provisions of Annex A, Chapter 12 of the Ceasefire Agreement relating to the normalization of the security situation along the borders of the Democratic Republic of the Congo with its neighbours;

13. *Condemns* all massacres and other atrocities carried out in the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and *urges* that an international investigation into all such events be carried out with a view to bringing to justice those responsible;

14. *Expresses* the view that the Governments of Uganda and Rwanda should make reparations for the loss of life and the property damage they have inflicted on the civilian population in Kisangani, and *requests* the Secretary-General to submit an assessment of the damage as a basis for such reparations;

15. *Calls on* all the parties to the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to protect human rights and respect international humanitarian law;

16. *Calls also on* all parties to ensure the safe and unhindered access of relief personnel to all those in need, and *recalls* that the parties must also provide guarantees for the safety, security and freedom of movement for United Nations and associated humanitarian relief personnel;

17. *Further calls on* all parties to cooperate with the International Committee of the Red Cross to enable it to carry out its mandate as well as the tasks entrusted to it under the Ceasefire Agreement;

18. *Reaffirms* the importance of holding, at the appropriate time, an international conference on peace, security, democracy and development in the Great Lakes region under the auspices of the United Nations and of the OAU, with the participation of all the Governments of the region and all others concerned;

19. *Expresses* its readiness to consider possible measures which could be imposed in accordance with its responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations in case of failure by parties to comply fully with this resolution;

20. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

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Letter dated 15 June 2000 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Today on 15 June 2000 a van ran into an anti-tank mine, planted by ethnic Albanian terrorist separatists on the Preoce-Lepina road, Municipality of Pristina, in Kosovo and Metohija, the autonomous province of the Yugoslav constituent Republic of Serbia, Zlatibor Denic from Krajiste, Municipality of Lipljan, and Borko Filipovic from Preoce, Municipality of Pristina, were killed in the explosion while Dejan Filipovic from Preoce, Municipality of Pristina, lost his arms and legs.

This vandal act is yet another glaring example of terrorism conducted by the members of the terrorist so-called Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) against the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija. It occurred in the presence of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) which leads to the conclusion that they deliberately turn a blind eye to these crimes, as it is otherwise inexplicable that the terrorists move freely and plant mines on the roads of Kosovo and Metohija without the international presences noticing it. The killing and the maiming of the three Serbs are yet another sorry example of the failure of those international presences to carry out their mandate under Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999 and to prevent terrorism and create a secure environment for all residents of Kosovo and Metohija. This terrorist act of ethnic Albanian separatists, as well as any others committed by them before, is aimed at intimidating the remaining Serbs and driving them out of Kosovo and Metohija. It provides eloquent proof of a flagrant violation of human rights as a function of ethnic cleansing.

Upon the instruction of my Government I request you to convene an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider these atrocities and to take resolute measures, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), aimed at apprehending the perpetrators of the atrocities and at ensuring a secure environment for all residents of Kosovo and Metohija.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Vladislav **Jovanovic**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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Letter dated 14 June 2000 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you of violations of the terms of the ceasefire between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Iraq, committed by the Iraqi side between 3 September and 2 December 1999 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Hadi **Nejad-Hosseinian**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the letter dated 14 June 2000 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

A. Ceasefire violations

1. On 9 September 1999 at 09:45 hrs. Iraqi forces set up an anti-air gun at 38S QA 47000-50000 coordinates of the Yabis map.

2. On 10 September 1999 at 23:00 hrs nine Iraqi civilians equipped with personal arms, R.P.G. and night-vision guggles who intended to illegally enter the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran from the west of Hoveizeh were fired at by Iranian forces as a result of which one of them was wounded and arrested.

3. On 16 September 1999 ten Iraqi forces along with a minibus and a Toyota pick-up were spotted installing barbed wire as long as 200 meters from around 38S ND 64500-27600 to 64500-27400 coordinates of the Qhasreshirin map.

4. On 17 September 1999 a telecommunication max was set up by Iraqi forces at 38R QA 66000-20000 coordinates of the Chazzabeh map.

5. On 13 September 1999 at 18:10 hrs. two Iraqi soldiers were spotted digging trenches on the height No. 283 at 38S NC/ND 40000-11000 coordinates of the Khosravi map.

6. On 12 September 1999 three Iraqi civilians including one man and two women who intended to illegally enter the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran were arrested by Iranian forces at 39R TP 33000-57000 coordinates of the Khorramshahr map.

7. On 3 September 1999 at 14:45 hrs. a Khaki painted Iraqi Toyota pick-up carrying 12 passengers dressed in civilian clothing along with a wireless moved from the Alfeiz outpost at 38S NB/PB 06000-47000 coordinates of the South of Mehran map to 09000-47000 coordinates of the same map and were positioned there.

8. On 3 September 1999 a convoy of vehicles from the Iraqi outpost No 2 at 38R QA 68000-24000 coordinates and Alkirameh outpost at 66000-24000 coordinates and Alvahab base at 65000-27000 coordinates of the Chazzabeh map were spotted moving and later on positioned at 38R QA 55000-42000, 58000-34000, 64000-27000 and 66000-24000 coordinates of the North of Hour-al-Hoveizeh map.

9. On 3 September 1999 Iraqi forces established a base and hoisted the Iraqi flag over it at 38R QV/QA 56000-52000 coordinates of the West of Hoveizeh map.

10. On 20 September 1999 at 10:00 hrs. five Iraqi soldiers were spotted setting up an anti-aircraft gun on the first anti-aircraft fortification at 38R QV 55000-48000 coordinates of the West of Jofeir map.

11. On 20 September 1999 at 02:00 hrs. three Iraqis by the names of Ahmad Ka'bi, Hamzah Sakin and Imad Ibadi who intended to illegally enter the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran at 39R TP 16000-75000 coordinates of the Khorramshahr map of which one of them was wounded and taken to the Khorramshar hospital.

12. On 4 October 1999 at 11:30 hrs. two Iraqi trucks carrying constructional materials, a bulldozer and a patrol vehicle, carrying 12 individuals, were spotted at work at 39R TP 17000-74000 coordinates of the Khorramshahr map.

13. On 3 October 1999 at 22:30 hrs. 7 Iraqis encountering Iranian forces at 39R TP 15000-75000 coordinates of the Khorramshar map tried to escape through a mine field but as a result of the explosion of mines 4 of them were killed, two others were wounded who were taken to the Sevom-Khordad Hospital in Khorramshahr and another one was arrested.

14. On 2 October 1999 at 08:00 hrs. an observation post was set up by Iraqi forces at 39R TP 45000-49000 coordinates of Khosroabad map around which five Iraqis were spotted at work.

15. On 8 October 1999 at 12:50 hrs. Iraqi forces were spotted setting up an observation post at 39R TP 14000-78000 coordinates of the Khorramshahr map.

16. On 8 October 1999 at 21:40 hrs. an Iraqi by the name of Javad Kazemi Salmani who intended to enter the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran was arrested by the Iranian forces at 39R TP 16000-76000 coordinates of the Khorramshahr map.

17. On 30 September 1999 at 10:35 hrs a gray Iraqi patrol boat carrying three passengers was spotted patrolling the territorial waters of the Islamic Republic of Iran at 39R TP 28000-67000 coordinates of the Khorramshahr map.

18. On 30 September 1999 at 13:10 hrs. a cream Iraqi patrol boat carrying two passengers was spotted patrolling the territorial waters of the Islamic Republic of Iran at 39R TP 41000-54000 coordinates of the Abadan map.

19. On 3 October 1999 a cream Iraqi patrol boat carrying one passenger was spotted in the territorial waters of the Islamic Republic of Iran at the end of the Minou Island at 39R TP 35000-59000 coordinates of the Khorramshahr map.

20. On 14 October 1999 at 17:00 hrs a group tent was erected by Iraqi forces at 38S NB/PB 95000-64000 coordinates of the Mehran map around which five Iraqis, dressed in green uniforms, were spotted moving.

21. On 9 October 1999 at 17:20 hrs. an Iraqi loader was spotted at work at 39R TQ 16000-08000 coordinates of the Hosseinieh map.

22. On 13 October 1999 at 08:30 hrs. an Iraqi bulldozer was spotted at work (paving the ground for the construction of a road) at 38S NC 42000-67000 coordinates of the Naftshahr map.

23. On 16 October 1999 at 08:30 hrs. an Iraqi grader was spotted at work at coordinates 38S NC 42000-68000 of the Naftshahr map.

24. On 16 October 1999 from 15:00 to 17:30 a group consisting of 40 journalists visited the Garmisheh area and outpost at 38S NB/PB 09000-47000 coordinates of the South Mehran map.

25. On 15 October 1999 at 07:00 hrs. an Iraqi by the name of Abdollah Jasem was arrested by Iranian forces while crossing the border, carrying 9 Klashnikou bullets at 39R TP/TQ 16000-80000 coordinates of the Navad map.

26. On 16 October 1999 at 10:30 hrs, 15 Iraqi soldiers, dressed in gray uniforms, were spotted diging trenches on the embankment opposite the Masoumshahi observation post at 39R TP 50000-42000 of the Khosroabad map.

27. On 31 October 1999 at 14:45 hrs. a white Iraqi patrol boat carrying two passengers was spotted in the region opposite Kuheh at 39R TP 28000-67000 of the Khorramshahr map.

28. On 31 October 1999 at 16:15 hrs a white Iraqi patrol boat carrying two passengers was spotted in the region opposite the Abadan refinery at 39R TP 37000-59000 coordinates of the Abadan map.

29. On 25 October 1999 at 08:45 hrs. 11 unarmed Iraqi soldiers (7 dressed in green

and 4 dressed in Khaki uniforms) were positioned at (38S NB/PB 00000-67000), (03000-66000),(03000-67000) of the Mehran map.

30. On 25 October 1999 at 08:50 hrs. two white Iraqi patrol vehicles carrying 10 passengers, dressed in black uniforms, were spotted moving and later positioned at 38S NC/PC 98000-83000 coordinates of the Salehabad map.

31. On 25 October 1999 at 14:20 hrs. an Iraqi grader was spotted at work at 39R TP 47000-35000 coordinates of the Khosroabad map.

32. On 24 October 1999 an Iraqi power shovel and construction vehicle were spotted at work at 38S QA 45000-54000 of the Yabis map.

33. On 24 October 1999 at 16:30 hrs. a gray Iraqi patrol boat carrying two passengers was spotted patrolling Mantageh Dou Asir at 39R TP 45000-48000 coordinates of the Khosroabad map.

34. On 25 October 1999 at 09:40 a white and blue painted Iraqi patrol boat carrying three passengers was spotted patrolling the outlet of the Nahre Gheimjeh (river) at 39R TP/TN 70000-13000 of the Alishir map.

35. On 25 October 1999 at 10:05 hrs a white and blue painted Iraqi patrol boat carrying three passengers were spotted patrolling the inlet of the Nahre Gheimjeh (river) at 39R TP/TN 70000-13000 coordinates of the Alishir map.

36. On 30 October 1999 at 14:30 hrs. an Iraqi construction vehicle was spotted at work at 38S NB 05000-68000 coordinates of the Mehran map.

37. On 30 October 1999 at 09:30 hrs. twelve Iraqi soldiers moved from the city of Bahdreh to Sadre Arafat outpost and took up positions at 38S NB/PB 05000-68600 coordinates of the Mehran map.

38. On 17 November 1999 at 15:00 hrs. an Iraqi helicopter was spotted flying over the Jaftalmout outpost at 38S NC 71000-22000 of the Halaleh map.

39. On 20 November 1999 at 17:30 hrs. a Khaki Iraqi Toyota pick-up carrying 13 soldiers armed with Klashnikov rifles and dressed in camouflage fatigues, moving from inside the Iraqi terrority entered the Douraji outpost at 38S NB/PB 09000-72000 coordinates of the Mehran map. The pick-up, after dropping off 11 soldiers and stopping there for 10 minutes, moved inside the Iraqi territory.

40. On 16 November 1999 at 9:00 hrs. a metal cabin was installed by the Iraqi forces at 38S NB/PB 97000-68000 coordinates of the Mehran map.

41. On 19 November 1999 at 09:40 hrs. a cream painted Iraqi patrol boat carrying three armed soldiers was spotted patrolling the inlet of the Nahre Qheimjeh (river) at 39R TP/TN 70000-13000 coordinates of the Alishir map.

42. On 20 November 1999 a white and red painted Iraqi single-engine patrol boat carrying armed passengers dressed in civilian clothing was spotted patrolling at 39R TP/TN 66000-15000 coordinates of the Alishir map.

43. On 20 November 1999 a white and red painted Iraqi single-engine boat carrying armed passengers-dressed in civilian clothing-was spotted at 39R TP/TN 41000-55000 coordinates of the Abadan map.

44. On 28 October 1999 at 18:00 hrs. an Iraqi civilian by the name of Monir Moradi Ahmadi who intended to illegally enter the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran was arrested by Iranian forces at 38S ND 56000-23000 coordinates of the Qhasreshirin map.

45. On 31 October and 1 November 1999 an Iraqi loader was spotted digging a canal in the vicinity of a 40-span metal bridge at 38S NB/PB 96000-68000 of the Mehran map.

46. On 1 November 1999 at 08:00 an Iraqi loader was spotted at work at 39R TP 47000-35000 coordinates of the Khosrabad map.

47. On 31 October 1999 at 14:30 an Iraqi loader was spotted at work at 39R QV 55000-48000 coordinates of the west Jofeir 2 map.

48. On 2 November 1999 an observation post was set up by Iraqi forces at 39R TP 15000-75000 coordinates of the Khorramshahr map.

49. On 3 November 1999 a tent was erected by Iraqi forces in the vicinity of the Taktak Meshgi outpost at 38S NC/NB 28000-99000 coordinates of the Angireh map.

50. On 3 November 1999 at 08:45 hrs. an Iraqi construction vehicle was spotted at work at 39R TP 43000-50000 coordinates of the Khosroabad map.

51. On 6 November 1999 at 09:00 hrs. three Iraqi soldiers were spotted installing an antenna resembling 292 R.C. and a rod antenna for radio transmission at 38S NB/PB 03000-66000 of the Mehran map.

52. On 4 November 1999 at 15:20 hrs. two Iraqi power shovels were spotted at work at 38R QV/QA 54000-47000 coordinates of the south of Hour-al-Hoveizeh map.

53. On 7 November 1999 at 07:50 hrs. an Iraqi power shovel was spotted at work at 39R TP 27000-69000 coordinates of the Khorramshahr map.

54. On 8 November 1999 at 10:00 hrs. an Iraqi who intended to enter the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran walked over a mine at 39R TP/TQ 17000-93000 coordinates of the Navael map and as a result lost his left leg. He was taken to the Khorramshar hospital.

55. On 8 November 1999 at 09:00 hrs. Iraqi forces were spotted setting up a metal tower at 39R TP/TN 59000-17000 coordinates of the Nahre Alishir map.

56. On 14 November 1999 at 09:00 hrs. a cream painted Iraqi single-engine patrol boat, carrying three passengers dressed in civilian clothing and armed with Klashnikov rifles, was spotted patrolling at 39R TP/TN 66000-15000 coordinates of the Nahre Alishir map.

57. On 8 November 1999 at 09:15 hrs. a white Iraqi single-engine patrol boat carrying three passengers was spotted patrolling at 39R TP/TN 63000-16000 of the Nahre Alishir map.

58. On 10 November 1999 at 09:50 hrs. an Iraqi loader was spotted at work at 39R TP 47000-35000 coordinates of the Khosrabad map.

59. On 10 November 1999 at 23:00 hrs. two Iraqi civilians by the names of Adnan Khaz'al A'shuri and Kazim Makarim Daniya were arrested by the Iranian border guards in Khorramshahr for violating the internal rules and regulations of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

60. On 14 November 1999 at 08:00 hrs. an Iraqi civilian armed with Klashnikof was arrested in the vicinity of the Bist station (station No. 20) and Samideh outpost at 38S QA 40000-62000 of the Yabis map.

61. On 14 November 1999 at 09:45 hrs. an Iraqi single-engine boat, carrying two

passengers dressed in civilian clothing and armed with firearms, was spotted at 39R TP/TN 64000-16000 coordinates of the Nahre Alishir map.

62. On 15 November 1999 at 16:30 hrs. an Iraqi loader was spotted at work at 38S NC 76000-14000 coordinates of the Halaleh map.

63. On 15 November 1999 a drilling platform was set up by Kurdish forces in chahar kala village for drilling a well at 38S ND 62000-39000 coordinates.

64. On 13 November 1999 at 17:30 hrs. five Iraqi women riding a pick-up were spotted collecting trash at 39R TQ 16000-11000 coordinates of the Hoseinieh map. They were arrested by the Iranian forces for their suspicious activities.

65. On 21 November 1999 at 09:30 hrs. nine Iraqi soldiers were spotted setting up an observation post at 38S NC 67000-24000 coordinates of the Kanisheikh map.

66. On 24 November 1999 at 13:20 hrs. a machine gun, a S.P.G. 9 and a mortar were set up by the Iraqi forces at 38S NB/PB 09000-72000 coordinates of the Mehran map.

67. On 25 November 1999 at 15:40 hrs. twelve Iraqis were dropped off by a pick-up at 38S NC 49000-47000 coordinates of the Soumar map who at 16.30 hrs. on the same day set up a tent at the same place.

68. On 24 November 1999 at 14:00 hrs. a cream painted Iraqi patrol boat carrying two armed passengers was spotted patrolling at 39R TP/TN 6000-17000 of the Nahre Alishir map.

69. On 30 November 1999 at 17:00 hrs. two black tents were erected by Iraqi forces at 38S NC 53000-46000 coordinates of the Soumar map.

70. On 1 December 1999 at 20:30 hrs. five Iraqis consisting of two women and three men who intended to enter the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran were arrested at 39R TP 44000-55000 coordinates of the Abadan map.

71. On 22 November 1999 at 22:40 hrs. seven Iraqis consisting of two men, one women and for four children were arrested by Iranian forces at 38S A 56000-98000 coordinates of Einekhosh map.

72. On 2 December 1999 at 12:45 hrs. a cream painted Iraqi patrol boat carrying two

passengers was spotted patrolling the inlet of the Minou Island at 39R TP 25000-63000 coordinates of the Khorramshahr map.

73. On 2 November 1999 at 17:10 hrs. an Iraqi crane was spotted at work at 38S QA 15000-95000 coordinates of the Nahre Anbar map.

B. Border events

1. On 8 September 1999 at 09:00 hrs. a yellow Iraqi loader was spotted digging an embankment at Garmisheh outpost at 38S NB/PB 09000-46000 coordinates of the South of Mehran Map.

2. On 6 September 1999 at 10:00 hrs. an Iraqi power shovel was spotted at work at 39R TP 50000-43000 coordinates of the Khosroabad map.

3. On 6 September 1999 at 19:15 an Iraqi construction vehicel was spotted at work at 39R TP 50000-42000 coordinates of the Khosroabad map.

4. On 7 September 1999 at 09:00 hrs. some Iraqi soldiers in groups of four & five were spotted digging ground at 38S QA 47000-50000 of the Yobis map.

5. On 14 September 1999 at 18:15 hrs. Iraqi forces were spotted setting up three observation posts at 38R QV 55000-42000 coordinates of the South of Hour-Al-Hoveizeh map.

6. On 14 September 1999 at 08:20 hrs. four Iraqi patrol, two Toyota and two IFA vehicles, each carrying 20 persons were spotted dropping soldiers and setting up tents at 38 NC/ND 37000-03000 coordinates of the khosravi map. Two persons dressed in Arabic clothings were seen among the soldiers. On the same date at 09.30 hrs, a bus carrying 15 persons from Khaneghein joined the convoy at the same coordinates.

7. On 14 September 1999 at 11:30 an Iraqi civilian by the name of Abdollah Saberi was arrested by Iranian forces at 38S NC/ND 53000-15000 coordinates of the Kharratha map.

8. On 18 September 1999 at 10:00 hrs. an Iraqi soldier by the name of Hamid Jasim Mohammad was arrested by Iranian forces at 38S NC/ND 41000-11000 coordinates of the Khosravi map.

9. On 8 September 1999 at 09:00 hrs an Iraqi loader was spotted digging an embankment at 38S NB/PB 95000-46000 coordinates of the South of Mehran map.

10. On 11 September 1999 an Iraqi vehicle carrying four passengers was spotted patrolling at 38S NC 43000-64000 coordinates of the Naftshahr map.

11. On 10 October, 1999 at 17:00 hrs. an Iraqi by the name of Adnan Nasif was arrested by Iranian forces at 38S NC/ND 43000-09000 coordinates of the Khosravi map.

12. On 12 October 1999 at 19:30 hrs. Iraqi forces stationed at Alahrir outpost at 38S QA 55000-42000 coordinates of the North of Hoveizeh map started shooting at an Iranian logistical pick-up moving between stations No 11 and 12 at 57000-42000 coordinates of the same map.

13. On 27 October 1999 at 11:30 hrs. 222 Iraqi refugees were delivered to Iraqi authorities in the Presence of Iranian forces and the officials of the U.N.H.C.R.

14. On 10 November 1999 at 10:45 hrs. a high platform was set up by kurds at 38S ND 60000-38000 coordinates of the Qhasreshirin map.

15. On 26 October 1999 at 05:00 hrs. an Iraqi by he name of Abdolhossein accompanied by two girls and one boy who intended to enter the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran were arrested by Iranian forces at 39R TP 56000-20000 coordinates of the Fav map.

16. On 21 November 1999 at 22:00 hrs. two Iraqi refugees were arrested by Iranian forces at Abziyadi outpost at 38S NB/PB 15000-49000 coordinates of the South of Mehran map.

17. On 17 November 1999 an Iraqi by the name of Qhasem Abdollah Marzough who intended to illegally enter the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran was arrested by Iranian forces at 39R TP 45000-50000 coordinates of the Abadan map.

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Security Council

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Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978)

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to my report of 22 May 2000 on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) (S/2000/460), which the Council endorsed on 23 May 2000 through the statement of the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2000/18). I am writing to inform the Council that Israel has met the requirements defined in my report of 22 May. I am, therefore, in a position to confirm that Israeli forces have withdrawn from Lebanon in compliance with resolution 425 (1978).

Mission of the Special Envoy

2. On 24 May 2000, my Special Envoy, Terje Roed-Larsen, and a team of technical experts returned to Lebanon to follow up, together with the Force Commander of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), on the implementation of my report of 22 May 2000. Between 24 May and 7 June, my Special Envoy and his team maintained frequent contact with the President and Prime Minister of Lebanon, as well as with the Speaker of Parliament and other Lebanese leaders. My Special Envoy met twice with the Prime Minister of Israel and, together with his team, also met the Minister for Foreign Affairs. My Special Envoy also met with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic. At the technical level, a number of meetings were held separately by the United Nations experts with their counterparts from the Governments of Israel and Lebanon.

3. I would like to thank the Governments of both Israel and Lebanon for extending their cooperation to my Special Envoy and his team throughout their mission. I would similarly like to thank the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic for its support, as well as the Governments of Egypt, Jordan, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Saudi Arabia for the constructive and supportive statements that they have made through this process.

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Implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978): fulfilment of the requirements established in the report of 22 May 2000

4. In my report of 22 May, I set out what the United Nations required of Israel, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic as well as the international community in order for resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) to be implemented fully.

5. I established three principal requirements for confirming an Israeli withdrawal in compliance with resolution 425 (1978): (a) the withdrawal of Israeli military and civilian personnel from Lebanese territory; (b) the dismantling of Israel's auxiliary force, known as the South Lebanon Army (SLA); and (c) the freeing of all detainees from Al-Khiam prison. I can today confirm that those requirements, endorsed by the Security Council, have been met.

Identifying the line for the purpose of confirming Israel's withdrawal

6. The Security Council will recall my view, expressed in my report of 22 May, that, in order to confirm whether Israel had withdrawn in accordance with resolution 425 (1978), the United Nations needed to identify a line to be adopted conforming to the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon based on the best available cartographic and other documentary material. During the mission of 26 April to 9 May 2000, undertaken by my Special Envoy and his team to the region, the parties and others were requested to provide information relevant to identifying this line to the United Nations by 15 May.[1] A map was subsequently prepared based on the information available to the United Nations.

7. Upon returning to the region, my Special Envoy and his team immediately began to discuss with the parties translating this line from the map to a line on the ground. During these technical consultations, which included joint United Nations-Israeli and United Nations-Lebanese on-site visits, certain refinements were made to the withdrawal line. In particular, the Government of Lebanon provided geographical coordinates that had not previously been made available to the United Nations.

8. The United Nations experts carefully considered all adjustments requested by both sides, while recalling that my report to the Security Council of 22 May had

[1] As noted in my report of 22 May, the international boundary between Israel and Lebanon was established pursuant to the 1923 Agreement between France and Great Britain entitled "Boundary Line between Syria and Palestine from the Mediterranean to El Hamme", which was reaffirmed in the "Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agreement" signed on 23 March 1949. Subsequently, there was a joint survey conducted under the auspices of the Mixed Armistice Commission, although there is no record that both Governments approved and adopted the geographic coordinates that were produced as part of this survey. There were, however, mutually agreed modifications to a limited number of segments of the boundary. Concerning the border between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, no international boundary agreement has been concluded between the two countries; therefore I recommended in my report of 22 May that the line separating the area of operations of UNIFIL from that of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) be adopted for the purpose of confirming Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon.

stated clearly that the United Nations was not engaged in a border demarcation exercise. Refinements were considered only insofar as they could be justified on cartographic grounds consistent with the body of information already available to the United Nations.

9. On 3 June, my Special Envoy met with the President and Prime Minister of Lebanon. He informed them that the technical discussions related to the withdrawal line had been concluded and that he would travel the next day to Israel to present the Prime Minister with the results of the discussions concerning the withdrawal line. My Special Envoy met with the Prime Minister of Israel on 4 June for this purpose.

10. On 5 June, my Special Envoy announced that consultations on this matter had been concluded. During the consultations, the Governments of Israel and Lebanon each informed my Special Envoy that some segments of the withdrawal line did not conform to how the respective Governments defined this border.

11. On 6 June, the Force Commander of UNIFIL formally transmitted the map of the withdrawal line to his Lebanese and Israeli counterparts. (A copy of the map is attached to the present report. A large-scale map is available in the office of the United Nations cartographic unit.)

Position of the Government of Lebanon

12. On 6 June 2000, the Government of Lebanon informed my Special Envoy that its position on the Israeli withdrawal was the following:

> In resolution 425 (1978), the Security Council called for the "strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries". It also called upon Israel to "withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese territory". The Security Council also decided "in light of the request of the Government of Lebanon to establish immediately under its authority a United Nations interim force for Southern Lebanon", one of the tasks of which would be to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces.
>
> As mentioned in the report of the Secretary-General of 22 May 2000 on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), for the purpose of confirming the Israeli withdrawal, the United Nations needed to "identify a line to be adopted conforming to the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon based on the best available cartographic and other documentary material". The United Nations would then identify "physically on the ground those portions of the line necessary or relevant to confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces".
>
> The report of the Secretary-General also stated that the international boundary between Israel and Lebanon was established pursuant to the 1923 Agreement between France and Great Britain entitled "Boundary Line between Syria and Palestine from the Mediterranean to El Hamme". This line was reaffirmed in the "Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agreement signed on 23 March 1949". Subsequently there were several modifications mutually agreed by Israel and Lebanon.

Between 24 May and 2 June 2000, the line identified by the United Nations, which was adopted conforming to the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon as mentioned above, for the purpose of confirming the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon was discussed on several occasions at meetings between the Government of Lebanon and the United Nations Special Envoy and his delegation. During that same period, this line was also physically shown on the ground to representatives of the Government by United Nations cartographers and members of UNIFIL.

The Government of Lebanon considers that this line does not conform in three locations to the internationally recognized border with Israel, and affirms that these locations are part of Lebanese territory. This affirmation was based essentially on the 1923 Treaty, the Israeli-Lebanon General Armistice Agreement, and the same principles admitted to confirm the Israeli withdrawal all along the internationally recognized boundary between Lebanon and Israel.

Concerning the Shab'a farmlands, Lebanon's position is that this area lies within Lebanon, and the Syrian position is that the farmlands are Lebanese. The withdrawal line that has been identified by the United Nations is, as stated in the Secretary-General's report, "without prejudice to future border agreements between the Member States concerned". Therefore, in adopting the UNIFIL-United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) line as the line for confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, the United Nations has not established any legally binding or relevant precedents concerning this part of the border between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic.

But concerning the eastern part of the border between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, stretching beyond the upper limit of the Shab'a farmlands area, Lebanon is insisting on the Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Lebanese territory in the Mount Hermon area, in conformity with Security Council resolution 425 (1978), which called on Israel to withdraw forthwith from all Lebanese territory.

The Government of Lebanon also insists on the immediate liberation of all Lebanese hostages and detainees (as well as the return of all Lebanese corpses) from Israeli prisons, since this situation was related to the period of occupation and its consequences.

The Government of Lebanon considers that all the equipment and infrastructure related to water, established by Israel during its occupation of Lebanese territory, should immediately be disconnected as part of the Israeli withdrawal, within the framework of resolution 425 (1978). In addition, the Government of Lebanon requests an immediate United Nations investigation into why the southern part of the Hasbani River runs dry.

The Government of Lebanon reaffirms that it will continue to cooperate fully with the United Nations, in accordance with Security Council resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978).

Position of the Government of Israel

13. On 8 June 2000, the Prime Minister of Israel informed me that the position of Israel was the following:

> Israel continues to have serious reservations in relation to the map prepared by the United Nations delineating the line to which Israel should redeploy in order to implement Security Council resolution 425 (1978). For example, in Israel's opinion, the course of the line chosen by the United Nations in the area of Border Pillar 4 and in the vicinity of the village of Metula is inaccurate. Similarly, Israel has consistently voiced its position that a line prepared for the purpose of implementing Security Council resolution 425 (1978) should not extend to the east of the Hasbani River. Nevertheless, based primarily on the consistent statements by the United Nations that the current line should not be interpreted as prejudicing either side's positions in relation to the location of the international boundary, Israel decided to accept the United Nations line for the purpose of the Israeli withdrawal. Israel understands that any and all claims, by either side, in relation to the location of the international boundary shall be reserved for the future peace negotiations.
>
> Israel's understanding of the mandate of the cartographic team was that the identification and marking of the line should be a technical stage only and should in no way change the course of the United Nations map line.
>
> Even prior to the arrival of the United Nations team in the area, Israel had already begun the process of dismantling positions and infrastructure that were seen by Israel as deviating from the United Nations line, and of preparing an alternative defensive line. These actions were taken in order to expedite the process as much as possible.
>
> Upon its arrival, the Israeli side assisted the United Nations cartographic team in identifying the line and in placing United Nations markings along its length. This process was finalized by 27 May 2000. However, when the United Nations team subsequently returned from deliberations with the Government of Lebanon, it raised various changes in the line, based largely on a list of coordinates prepared during the 1950s, the legal validity of which is extremely questionable. Israel considers such proposals to be clearly outside the scope of the mandate of the cartographic team in accordance with the Secretary-General's report.
>
> Notwithstanding the above, Israel decided to accede to the United Nations request and accept modifications on the ground in four specific locations, despite the fact that accepting the new United Nations proposals required the dismantling of additional infrastructure and Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) positions. Israel's decision in this regard was reached due to our sincere desire to cooperate with the United Nations in the implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978), and to establish a stable environment along the line as rapidly as possible.
>
> Israel understands that its agreement to these changes would comprise the final resolution of the United Nations map line issue. As a result, Israel was deeply disturbed, upon sending its professional teams to the field in order to implement this understanding, to discover that additional changes were now

being raised. In spite of deep reservations, relating both to the new changes and to the entire process, and with the goal of bringing the entire operation to a speedy conclusion, Israel decided to accede to these amendments as well.

It is Israel's distinct impression that this turn of events was the result of the fact that, while Israel was doing its utmost to cooperate with the United Nations in the fulfilment of its mandate, other interested parties were doing all in their power to achieve the opposite result.

Israel has undertaken a historic step. It has publicly acknowledged Security Council resolution 425 (1978); publicly supported the report of the Secretary-General of 22 May; implemented on the ground a withdrawal of Israeli forces to behind the United Nations map line; and fully cooperated with the United Nations in identifying and marking the line on the ground. All these steps have been taken in the face of extreme hazards and uncertainty.

In accordance with the sequence of events envisaged in your report, it is now time for all other parties to fulfil their undertakings: the United Nations should publicly acknowledge that Israel has fulfilled its obligations; UNIFIL should be fully deployed, and should exert maximum effort in facilitating quiet and stability along the line; the Lebanese Government should take all necessary steps to assume full responsibility over all of Lebanon; and both Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic must take all required measures to ensure the complete cessation of all hostile activities against Israel.

In Israel's opinion, only if all the parties involved fully comply with their undertakings is there a real chance of establishing and maintaining a peaceful and stable reality on the ground. Such a reality, in turn, could greatly facilitate the re-energizing of the peace process with both the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon, which should be our ultimate objective.

As a final note, Israel wishes to refer again to the issue of the village of Rajr. While the course of the line in the area of the village has been determined, the actual regime to be applied should enable the continuation of the normal life of its residents. The village of Rajr, a former Syrian village, now being partially divided by the United Nations line between Israel and Lebanon, poses a humanitarian problem of the highest order. In this context, Israel calls upon the assistance of the United Nations in reaching a solution for this issue to be based upon the principles of fairness, practicality and humanity.

14. Notwithstanding the reservations of the two Governments about the withdrawal line, Israel and Lebanon have confirmed that identifying this line was solely the responsibility of the United Nations and that they will respect the line as identified. The United Nations experts completed their work in marking relevant portions of this line on the ground on 7 June 2000.

Confirming Israeli compliance with Security Council resolution 425 (1978)

15. As soon as the Security Council endorsed my report of 22 May, UNIFIL began using mobile patrols of observers to determine that positions previously known to be held by IDF and SLA were no longer occupied. By 16 June, UNIFIL was in a

position to confirm that Israeli forces had withdrawn from Lebanon in compliance with the line of withdrawal identified by the United Nations.

16. Further, UNIFIL reported on 16 June that it had observed no incursions into Lebanese air space or territorial waters.

17. Concerning SLA, my report established that it was the responsibility of the Government of Israel to ensure that the de facto force, known as the South Lebanon Army (SLA) ceases to exist. In this connection, three requirements were identified: (a) the command structure of SLA must be dismantled; (b) logistical support and supplies of any type from the Government of Israel must cease; and (c) heavy weapons in the possession of SLA, including tanks, artillery and mortar, must be removed or destroyed. UNIFIL has confirmed that SLA has disbanded. Many of its personnel and their families have gone to Israel; others have given themselves up or have been turned over to the Lebanese authorities. Some of the SLA's heavy weapons have been taken to Israel or destroyed by the Israeli forces; the Government of Lebanon informed my Special Envoy that the remainder of the weapons have been collected by the Lebanese authorities or turned over to the authorities by Lebanese who had taken them.

18. Concerning the detainees held at Al-Khiam prison, all were freed when the prison was opened by the local inhabitants on 22 May.

Cooperation of the Government of Lebanon

19. In my report of 22 May, I requested the cooperation of the Government of Lebanon in the process of identifying, on the ground, the line to be used for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal. The Government appointed a team of technical experts to work with the United Nations cartographers and several joint visits to the area of the withdrawal line were made, by both UNIFIL helicopters and vehicles.

Return of the effective authority of the Government of Lebanon in the area

20. In my report of 22 May, I observed that as soon as the United Nations had confirmed that the Israeli withdrawal had been completed in compliance with the requirements established in that report, the Lebanese Government should resume the normal responsibilities of a State throughout the area. As Israel withdrew its forces from Lebanon, the Government of Lebanon began to reassert law and order functions throughout the area. According to the Government, there are at present approximately 1,000 members of various police and security agencies present in southern Lebanon. They have established police stations, set up roadblocks and pursued active patrolling. Customs officials have also been sent to the area to prevent the illegal import of goods, vehicles and products made in Israel. Progress in the return of law and order functions of the Government of Lebanon as well as the resumption of public services in the area has been encouraging.

21. I stated in my report of 22 May that the Lebanese armed forces should ensure that all national territory falls under the effective authority of the Government. The Government has said that it would consider deploying the armed forces in southern

Lebanon once I had confirmed that Israel had met its obligations under Security Council resolution 425 (1978). The deployment of the armed forces is an essential element of the return of the effective authority of the Government in the area. This deployment should be conducted in coordination with UNIFIL's redeployment in its area of operations. Now that I can confirm Israel's withdrawal, I anticipate that the Government of Lebanon will systematically address this matter. I was pleased to learn on 12 June that, as an important first step, a composite special unit, comprising army and internal security personnel, is to deploy to the formerly Israeli-controlled area and establish its operational command at Marjayoun, and two regional commands at Marjayoun and Bint Jibayl.

22. Since the first mission of my Special Envoy to Lebanon, the United Nations has expressed its concern for the well-being of the inhabitants of southern Lebanon. The Security Council may recall from my last report that the Government of Lebanon had given assurances in this regard. In particular, the President, the Prime Minister and the Speaker of the Parliament had affirmed to my Special Envoy that acts of vengeance would not be tolerated. Since the beginning of the withdrawal of Israeli forces, the Government of Lebanon as well as political figures throughout the country have publicly endorsed the impartial application of the rule of law throughout the area. The Government of Lebanon has handled this sensitive matter in a positive manner. The United Nations knows of no acts of vengeance, although some looting is reported to have occurred on a small scale.

23. With the completion of the Israeli withdrawal, Lebanese sovereignty has been restored to the Lebanese side of the village of Ghajar. This village is located partly in Lebanon and partly in the Syrian Arab Republic; the Lebanese side was apparently subject to de facto Syrian control and united with the Syrian side of the village in 1963; both sides were occupied by Israel in 1967 and then annexed by Israel in 1981. The withdrawal line identified by the United Nations placed two thirds of the village in Lebanon and one third in the Israeli-occupied part of the Syrian Arab Republic. UNIFIL confirmed on 16 June 2000 that Israeli forces had been withdrawn from the Lebanese side of the village.

24. Given this unusual situation, I have written to President Lahoud advising him that it would not be conducive to the maintenance of public order and peace if either UNIFIL or the Government of Lebanon were to deploy military, security or civilian personnel in the village at this stage. For this reason, I have advised both the President of Lebanon and the Prime Minister of Israel that UNIFIL will not, for the time being, deploy inside the village, but will be present nearby. I have further advised that, in my view, the situation there is highly volatile and that measures must first be taken to reduce tension and ensure the smooth and effective assumption of public order and administrative functions by Lebanon in regard to the northern two thirds of the village. I have also written to Prime Minister Barak, noting that there can be no doubt that two thirds of the village lies within Lebanese territory and that assisting the Government of Lebanon in the return of its effective authority in the south of the country was one of UNIFIL's principal tasks. I have assured both parties that the United Nations stands ready to assist in this endeavour.

25. As I indicated in my report of 22 May, the Lebanese Government has developed plans for the reconstruction of southern Lebanon. The Government has placed a strong emphasis on the need for quick action on this matter. The United Nations is giving its full support to the Government in its efforts to improve living

conditions in the area. My Special Envoy, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank will be working together on coordination arrangements to ensure early mobilization of resources and support for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of southern Lebanon.

Cooperation from the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic as requested in the report of 22 May 2000

26. In my report of 22 May, I asked the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic for its cooperation on all relevant matters and can report to the Security Council that my Special Envoy has received such cooperation.

Conditions of security and safety in the area

27. The military and security situation in the former Israeli-controlled area can be described as calm and relatively stable. There were reports of some stone throwing and shooting incidents at the Fatma/Metulla gate, and two Lebanese civilians were injured by IDF rubber-bullet rounds on 28 May. Subsequently, the Lebanese authorities set up roadblocks and restricted passage to the border, while armed elements erected earth barriers to block the approach to the gate. As a result, the tension has substantially subsided. Strict restrictions on movement to the border will have to be maintained to avoid further incidents and casualties. The Lebanese forces have also destroyed a number of abandoned IDF and SLA positions.

28. The visible presence of armed elements has been steadily decreasing throughout the area and their checkpoints have been removed. In general, the armed elements have been acting in a responsible and disciplined manner.

29. UNIFIL has maintained a visible presence by means of proactive patrolling, which has had a very useful and calming effect on the security situation and has been clearly welcomed by the local population. UNIFIL troops have also engaged in humanitarian assistance to the local population. Food packages and water are being distributed to needy families. All battalions continue to provide medical assistance to the local population and a medical and dental clinic has been set up in the area. UNIFIL also assisted in the return of some SLA members and their families from Israel by providing transportation from the border and accompanying them to the Lebanese authorities.

Future role of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

30. The first phase of the reinforcement of UNIFIL, as outlined in my report of 22 May 2000, is currently under way, and I expect that the force will reach the level of 5,600 troops early next month.

31. I stated in my report of 22 May that, once the Israeli withdrawal is confirmed, and if the security situation permits, UNIFIL would have to be further reinforced with two mechanized infantry battalions. Owing to time constraints, I stressed that the troop reinforcements were required to possess a high degree of self-sufficiency and the capability of deploying to the mission area using their own national assets. I also indicated that, should the resources requested not be made available in a timely

manner, there is a possibility that UNIFIL would be unable to adequately cover its full area of operations.

32. I wish to inform the Security Council that no firm commitments that meet these criteria have yet been made for the additional infantry units, and I am not, therefore, in a position to state when they will be available and deployed.

33. In the meantime, UNIFIL will use the resources available to it to extend its deployment in those areas not covered at present by the Force. To that end, UNIFIL will establish patrol bases in a number of locations, set up temporary observation posts as appropriate and undertake active patrolling throughout those areas. The Force will also continue to provide humanitarian assistance to the local population.

34. At the same time, UNIFIL is discussing with the Government of Lebanon ways and means to rapidly reassert its authority in the south, in particular with a view to enabling UNIFIL to adapt and reinforce its own presence in the area vacated by the Israeli forces.

35. In accordance with resolution 425 (1978), UNIFIL will use its best efforts to help prevent the recurrence of fighting and to create the conditions for the restoration of the effective authority of the Government of Lebanon in this area. The guidelines for the operations of UNIFIL, contained in the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), and approved by the Council, continue to be applicable.

36. The security and safety of United Nations personnel remains a central concern, and I wish to emphasize once again that the Government of Lebanon has the primary responsibility for ensuring the security and safety of United Nations personnel on Lebanese territory. The President has confirmed that the Government of Lebanon would work to ensure the security and safety of UNIFIL.

Conclusion

37. Israel has met the requirements for the implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978) as set forth in my report to the Council of 22 May 2000. Namely, Israel has completed its withdrawal in conformity with the line identified by the United Nations, SLA has been dismantled; accordingly there are no more supply lines; its heavy weapons have been removed or destroyed by Israel or are now in the hands of the Government of Lebanon; and there are no more detainees at Al-Khiam prison.

38. The Government of Lebanon cooperated with the United Nations in the implementation of the report of 22 May and has moved quickly to re-establish its effective authority in the area through the deployment of security forces in the area. On 12 June, the Government informed the United Nations that it would send a composite force composed of army and internal security personnel to be based in Marjayoun. Although the Government has not yet deployed the armed forces throughout southern Lebanon, it has stated that it will consider doing so as soon as I have confirmed Israel's withdrawal in compliance with Security Council resolution 425 (1978) and my report of 22 May 2000.

39. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic was very cooperative throughout the latest mission of my Special Envoy, as were other interested Member States in the region and elsewhere.

40. On the basis of these developments, I can report to the Security Council that Israel has withdrawn its forces from Lebanon in accordance with resolution 425 (1978) and met the requirements defined in my report of 22 May 2000.

Map No. 4142 UNITED NATIONS
June 2000

Department of Public Information
Cartographic Section

United Nations S/2000/590/Corr.1

Security Council

Distr.: General
21 June 2000

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978)

Corrigendum

Replace the map at the end of the report with the attached map.

00-48985 (E) 210600



Map No. 4143 UNITED NATIONS
June 2000

Department of Public Information
Cartographic Section

United Nations S/2000/591

Security Council

Distr.: General
20 June 2000
English
Original: English/French

Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions concerning the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, including resolutions 1031 (1995) of 15 December 1995, 1035 (1995) of 21 December 1995, 1088 (1996) of 12 December 1996, 1144 (1997) of 19 December 1997, 1168 (1998) of 21 May 1998, 1174 (1998) of 15 June 1998, 1184 (1998) of 16 July 1998, and 1247 (1999) of 18 June 1999,

Reaffirming its commitment to the political settlement of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States there within their internationally recognized borders,

Underlining its commitment to supporting implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Annexes thereto (collectively the Peace Agreement, S/1995/999, annex),

Emphasizing its appreciation to the High Representative, the Commander and personnel of the multinational stabilization force (SFOR), the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the personnel of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), including the Commissioner and personnel of the International Police Task Force (IPTF), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the personnel of other international organizations and agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina for their contributions to the implementation of the Peace Agreement,

Noting that the States in the region must play a constructive role in the successful development of the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and *noting* especially the obligations of the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in this regard as signatories to the Peace Agreement,

Welcoming, in this regard, the recent positive steps taken by the Republic of Croatia to strengthen its bilateral relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as its increasing cooperation with all relevant international organizations in implementing the Peace Agreement,

Emphasizing that a comprehensive and coordinated return of refugees and displaced persons throughout the region continues to be crucial to lasting peace,

00-49166 (E) 210600

Taking note of the declaration of the Ministerial meeting of the Peace Implementation Conference in Brussels on 23 and 24 May 2000 (S/2000/586, annex) and the conclusions of its previous meetings,

Noting the reports of the High Representative, including his latest report of 4 May 2000 (S/2000/376),

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 2 June 2000 (S/2000/529), and *noting* that the UNMIBH judicial system assessment programme will be concluded by December 2000,

Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Determined to promote the peaceful resolution of the conflicts in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel adopted on 9 December 1994 and the statement of its President of 10 February 2000 (S/PRST/2000/4),

Welcoming and *encouraging* efforts by the United Nations to sensitize peacekeeping personnel in the prevention and control of HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases in all its peacekeeping operations,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

I

1. *Reaffirms* once again its support for the Peace Agreement, as well as for the Dayton Agreement on implementing the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina of 10 November 1995 (S/1995/1021, annex), *calls upon* the parties to comply strictly with their obligations under those Agreements, and *expresses* its intention to keep the implementation of the Peace Agreement, and the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, under review;

2. *Reiterates* that the primary responsibility for the further successful implementation of the Peace Agreement lies with the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina themselves and that the continued willingness of the international community and major donors to assume the political, military and economic burden of implementation and reconstruction efforts will be determined by the compliance and active participation by all the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina in implementing the Peace Agreement and rebuilding a civil society, in particular in full cooperation with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in strengthening joint institutions and in facilitating returns of refugees and displaced persons;

3. *Reminds* the parties once again that, in accordance with the Peace Agreement, they have committed themselves to cooperate fully with all entities involved in the implementation of this peace settlement, as described in the Peace Agreement, or which are otherwise authorized by the Security Council, including the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, as it carries out its responsibilities for dispensing justice impartially, and *underlines* that full cooperation by States and entities with the International Tribunal includes, *inter*

alia, the surrender for trial of all persons indicted by the Tribunal and provision of information to assist in Tribunal investigations;

4. *Emphasizes* its full support for the continued role of the High Representative in monitoring the implementation of the Peace Agreement and giving guidance to and coordinating the activities of the civilian organizations and agencies involved in assisting the parties to implement the Peace Agreement, and *reaffirms* that the High Representative is the final authority in theatre regarding the interpretation of Annex 10 on civilian implementation of the Peace Agreement and that in case of dispute he may give his interpretation and make recommendations, and make binding decisions as he judges necessary on issues as elaborated by the Peace Implementation Council in Bonn on 9 and 10 December 1997;

5. *Expresses* its support for the declaration of the Ministerial meeting of the Peace Implementation Conference in Brussels on 23 and 24 May 2000;

6. *Recognizes* that the parties have authorized the multinational force referred to in paragraph 10 below to take such actions as required, including the use of necessary force, to ensure compliance with Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement;

7. *Reaffirms* its intention to keep the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina under close review, taking into account the reports submitted pursuant to paragraphs 18 and 25 below, and any recommendations those reports might include, and its readiness to consider the imposition of measures if any party fails significantly to meet its obligations under the Peace Agreement;

II

8. *Pays tribute* to those Member States which participated in the multinational stabilization force established in accordance with its resolution 1088 (1996), and *welcomes* their willingness to assist the parties to the Peace Agreement by continuing to deploy a multinational stabilization force;

9. *Notes* the support of the parties to the Peace Agreement for the continuation of the multinational stabilization force, set out in the declaration of the Ministerial meeting of the Peace Implementation Conference in Madrid on 16 December 1998 (S/1999/139, annex);

10. *Authorizes* the Member States acting through or in cooperation with the organization referred to in Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement to continue for a further planned period of 12 months the multinational stabilization force (SFOR) as established in accordance with its resolution 1088 (1996) under unified command and control in order to fulfil the role specified in Annex 1-A and Annex 2 of the Peace Agreement, and *expresses* its intention to review the situation with a view to extending this authorization further as necessary in the light of developments in the implementation of the Peace Agreement and the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

11. *Authorizes* the Member States acting under paragraph 10 above to take all necessary measures to effect the implementation of and to ensure compliance with Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement, *stresses* that the parties shall continue to be held equally responsible for compliance with that Annex and shall be equally subject to such enforcement action by SFOR as may be necessary to ensure

implementation of that Annex and the protection of SFOR, and *takes note* that the parties have consented to SFOR's taking such measures;

12. *Authorizes* Member States to take all necessary measures, at the request of SFOR, either in defence of SFOR or to assist the force in carrying out its mission, and *recognizes* the right of the force to take all necessary measures to defend itself from attack or threat of attack;

13. *Authorizes* the Member States acting under paragraph 10 above, in accordance with Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement, to take all necessary measures to ensure compliance with the rules and procedures established by the Commander of SFOR, governing command and control of airspace over Bosnia and Herzegovina with respect to all civilian and military air traffic;

14. *Requests* the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina to cooperate with the Commander of SFOR to ensure the effective management of the airports of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the light of the responsibilities conferred on SFOR by Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement with regard to the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina;

15. *Demands* that the parties respect the security and freedom of movement of SFOR and other international personnel;

16. *Invites* all States, in particular those in the region, to continue to provide appropriate support and facilities, including transit facilities, for the Member States acting under paragraph 10 above;

17. *Recalls* all the agreements concerning the status of forces as referred to in Appendix B to Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement, and *reminds* the parties of their obligation to continue to comply therewith;

18. *Requests* the Member States acting through or in cooperation with the organization referred to in Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement to continue to report to the Council, through the appropriate channels and at least at monthly intervals;

* * *

Reaffirming the legal basis in the Charter of the United Nations on which the IPTF was given its mandate in resolution 1035 (1995),

III

19. *Decides* to extend the mandate of UNMIBH, which includes the IPTF, for an additional period terminating on 21 June 2001, and *also decides* that the IPTF shall continue to be entrusted with the tasks set out in Annex 11 of the Peace Agreement, including the tasks referred to in the Conclusions of the London, Bonn, Luxembourg, Madrid and Brussels Conferences and agreed by the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

20. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Council regularly informed and to report at least every six months on the implementation of the mandate of UNMIBH as a whole;

21. *Reiterates* that the successful implementation of the tasks of the IPTF rests on the quality, experience and professional skills of its personnel, and once

again *urges* Member States, with the support of the Secretary-General, to ensure the provision of such qualified personnel;

22. *Reaffirms* the responsibility of the parties to cooperate fully with, and to instruct their respective responsible officials and authorities to provide their full support to, the IPTF on all relevant matters;

23. *Reiterates* its call upon all concerned to ensure the closest possible coordination between the High Representative, SFOR, UNMIBH and the relevant civilian organizations and agencies so as to ensure the successful implementation of the Peace Agreement and of the priority objectives of the civilian consolidation plan, as well as the security of IPTF personnel;

24. *Urges* Member States, in response to demonstrable progress by the parties in restructuring their law enforcement institutions, to intensify their efforts to provide, on a voluntary-funded basis and in coordination with the IPTF, training, equipment and related assistance for local police forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

25. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to continue to submit to the Council reports from the High Representative, in accordance with Annex 10 of the Peace Agreement and the conclusions of the Peace Implementation Conference held in London on 4 and 5 December 1996 (S/1996/1012), and later Peace Implementation Conferences, on the implementation of the Peace Agreement and in particular on compliance by the parties with their commitments under that Agreement;

26. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

United Nations A/54/922–S/2000/592

General Assembly
Security Council

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General Assembly
Fifty-fourth session
Items 116 (a) and 116 (d)

Human rights questions: Implementation of human rights instruments

Human rights questions: Comprehensive implementation of and follow-up to the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action

Security Council
Fifty-fifth year

Letter dated 16 June 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Eritrea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit a press release issued today, 16 June 2000, by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Eritrea on Ethiopian atrocities against civilians in the occupied Eritrean territories (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would kindly circulate this letter and its annex as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 116 (a) and 116 (d), and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Haile **Menkerios**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

00-48483 (E) 160600

Annex to the letter dated 16 June 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Eritrea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Ethiopia uproots entire villages in the Gash-Setit region

As the Ethiopian regime publicly pronounces its acceptance of the OAU Agreement on a ceasefire, it continues to perpetrate its acts of State vandalism and wanton destruction in the occupied areas.

In the last couple of days since Ethiopia occupied Tesseney, more than 15,000 villagers have been uprooted from their homelands in Awgaro, Aarekeb, Debro, Adi Bgidi, Augomo, Germen, Maishglen, Antore and Biko in the Gash-Setit region by the Ethiopian army, which has confiscated their cattle, looted other property and burned most of the villages. The Gash-Setit region is undisputed sovereign Eritrean territory.

Ethiopia's deplorable acts of evicting villagers from their homelands are designed to disrupt agricultural production during this crucial farming season. In the same vein, Ethiopia's reoccupation of Tesseney this week has no military significance other than preventing the return of the displaced population and the resumption of agricultural activities. Indeed, Ethiopia's Prime Minister alluded to this sinister objective during his briefing session to the diplomatic community in Addis Abeba yesterday when he stated that the temporary security zone which is entirely inside Eritrea will enable Ethiopian farms to cultivate their lands. Addis Abeba's transparent design is to delay the redeployment of its troops from these areas until the onset of the rainy season in order to adversely affect Eritrea's agricultural production this year.

United Nations A/54/923–S/2000/593

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Agenda items 116 (a) and (d)
Human rights questions: implementation of human rights instruments; comprehensive implementation of and follow-up to the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action

Security Council
Fifty-fifth year

Letter dated 16 June 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Eritrea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit a comprehensive statement issued today, 16 June, by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Eritrea in response to a resolution of the Ethiopian Parliament adopted on 13 June 2000 concerning the human rights of Ethiopians living in Eritrea (see annex). This statement not only responds to Ethiopia's false allegations, but also exposes Ethiopia's gross human rights abuses, which it has perpetrated and continues to perpetrate with impunity, on the people of Eritrea and Ethiopian citizens of Eritrean origin over the past two years.

I should be grateful if you would kindly circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 116 (a) and (d), and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Haile **Menkerios**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

00-48512 (E) 190600

Annex to the letter dated 16 June 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Eritrea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Response of the Government of the State of Eritrea to the resolution adopted by the Council of the People's Representatives of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia on 13 June 2000

1. On 13 June 2000, the Council of the People's Representatives of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (i.e. the Ethiopian Parliament) issued a resolution on the purported violation of the human rights of Ethiopians living in Eritrea.

2. This resolution was issued only a few weeks after the international community has been alerted by the Government of Eritrea of the war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the Ethiopian army as it was being evicted from areas of Eritrea which it had temporarily occupied as a result of its latest aggression in mid-May 2000. It also comes as the OAU and the international community seem to be enforcing the acceptance of a peace plan to end the two (2) year old conflict. It is not difficult to conclude that the twin purposes of this resolution are to, on the one hand, create yet another pretext to torpedo the OAU peace plan and, on the other, create a convenient subterfuge to dissipate guilt by portraying Eritrea as an equally guilty party. By this subterfuges, Ethiopia hopes to convince the world to condemn Eritrea along with Ethiopia.

3. It is a matter of public record that, during the two (2) years of the conflict, Ethiopia has been systematically and willfully violating the human rights of not only Eritreans but also of Ethiopians of Eritrean origin. It had deported more than seventy thousand (70,000) without any due process of law, detained more than one thousand five hundred (1500) Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin in hostile internment camps like Didessa, caused the disappearance of two thousand (2000),

deprived individuals of their citizenship in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner, subjected the victims to inhumane and degrading treatment and torture, separated families, and confiscated homes, shops and other property without compensation. These violations have been severely denounced by several credible NGOs, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.

It is also a matter of public record that the Ethiopian Air force has systematically bombed Eritrean villages, towns and ports, killing many innocent people including women and children and destroying civilian infrastructure, cattle and farms. There have also been many extra-judicial killings.

4. The Government of Ethiopia has been able to commit its crimes with impunity only because the international community had preferred to remain silent, except on a few occasions, in the face of these blatant violations in spite of repeated requests by the Eritrean Government and people as well as protests, and expressions of denunciation, by numerous other members of the international community, including in particular the relevant human rights NGOs. It is therefore a mockery of the principles and norms of human rights and a scathing commentary on the values held by the international community that Ethiopia, which had so systematically and brutally trampled on all the human rights conventions as well as the Geneva Conventions and the protocols, should now refer to, and appeal in the name of, the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and other international human rights instruments as well as the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. But then, is it not said that "the devil can cite scripture for his purpose....[and] and an evil soul produces holy witness"?

5. The false and absurd charges made by the Ethiopian Parliament that the Eritrean Government and people are committing human rights violations against Ethiopians residing in Eritrea is yet another clumsy attempt by the Ethiopian Government to cover up its most recent horrendous war crimes and human rights violations which, *inter alia*, included the razing of villages, pillaging, looting, destruction of farms, shops, hotels, gas-stations, garages and other private property as well as kidnapping, murder and rape. These crimes have been observed by eyewitnesses from the international community and media and recorded for posterity and study by any interested party.

The Government of Ethiopia is responsible, and will have to account, for these latest criminal acts as well as previous violations of human rights, war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes against peace. It becomes obvious that the Ethiopian Parliament which, by acting as the devil's chaplain, has become an accomplice to the crimes of the executive branch and shall be held equally responsible and accountable for the crimes. If the Ethiopian Parliament were really concerned on the respect of human rights, it should have investigated the violations committed by the executive branch to pass a motion of censure and due apology to the Eritrean people.

6. In this connection it must be noted that the Eritrean National Assembly (i.e. Parliament) had on 26 June 1998, right at the beginning of the conflict, issued a clear declaration which stated that "*the Eritrean Government has not, and will not, take any hostile action against Ethiopians residing in the country. Their right to live and work in peace is guaranteed. If this right is infringed under any circumstances or by any institution, they have the full right of redress. This policy that can see a horizon beyond the conflict of today will not change even if the crises deteriorates to any degree.*"

It is also a matter of public record that the most prominent and credible human rights agencies have, during the past two years consistently reported that, by and large, the Eritrean Government had protected the human rights of Ethiopians residing in Eritrea and had repeatedly dismissed such Ethiopian charges. A cursory review of any of these reports will reveal that all Ethiopian charges against Eritrea have been followed by statements like "*Amnesty International has found no eyewitness accounts or independent corroboration of this incident*". The 1999 Country Report on Eritrea by the US Department of State is also replete with the reminder that "*Investigations of the Ethiopian allegations by international human rights groups and local and foreign officials revealed no evidence to substantiate the charges*".

On the other hand, almost all human rights agencies confirm the Human Rights Watch Report of 1999 that "*compelling evidence pointed to a deliberate campaign by the Ethiopian authorities to expel Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin to Eritrea*".... and that "*the deportations and accompanying violations of a range of rights of the deportees also*

violated Ethiopia's obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties it has ratified and indeed incorporated into the law of the land". It must also be recalled that the OAU Committee of Ambassadors which visited both Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998 had concluded that Ethiopia has systematically violated the human rights of Eritreans residing in Ethiopia while Eritrea had scrupulously protected the rights of Ethiopians residing in Eritrea.

The Ethiopian Government has not denied the commission of the crimes. Indeed, it was the Prime Minister himself who, in an interview with Radio Ethiopia on 9 July 1998, declared that if his government were to say to any foreigner "*Go, because we do not like the color of your eyes they have to leave*". Thus, the statement from the Ethiopian Parliament seems to suggest that the international conventions apply to others while Ethiopia can contemptuously trample them.

It is for this reason that any Ethiopian accusations that the Government and people of Eritrea have systematically attacked Ethiopian civilians and otherwise violated their human rights cannot be taken seriously. Would it be credible that a government which has restrained itself from any retaliatory acts during the worst days of the Ethiopian Government's violations of the rights of Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin to act so irrationally on the eve of the presumed signing of a peace plan which provides for the investigation of human rights?

7. It is true that there are Ethiopian nationals in shelters for the displaced in Shiketti, Adi Keih and other places in Eritrea. These Ethiopians are a component of the displaced populations from Eritrean villages and towns which have been militarily attacked by Ethiopia and, having suffered the fate of their Eritrean neighbors, are now living in the same shelter that have become the temporary abodes of their Eritrean counterparts, are faced with the same problems and predicaments that confront the Eritreans and benefit from exactly the same assistance that the Eritreans are receiving. This has been verified by members of the international community, including the ICRC, and are there to be visited by any party. It is also true that the Eritrean Government is, with the collaboration of the ICRC, finalizing the necessary arrangements to expedite the **voluntary** departure of Ethiopians that have decided of their own free will to return to Ethiopia. It must also be recognized that

the Eritrean Government may, when it finds it unavoidable, also have to take the appropriate legal steps to repatriate Ethiopians residing in Eritrea on a case by case basis to their state of origin.

8. There is no denying that very few Eritrean youth have, after being provoked and taunted by some Ethiopians, rashly and emotionally taken the law into their hands after hearing of Ethiopian's latest aggression. It is a tribute to the Government of Eritrea that it took swift and resolute action to end these illegalities, including the public denunciation of the acts and warnings against any similar action in the future, and to contain what may have developed into an ugly situation with very sad consequences. It also took the necessary legal steps to ensure the safety and security of Ethiopians that may have needed it. This too has been verified- and can be confirmed by- the members of the international community.

9. In this connection, it must be stated for the record that, throughout the last two (2) years of conflict, the Eritrean Government and its representatives had repeatedly invited the international community, and particularly the OAU and the UN human rights mechanisms at all levels, to send missions or to appoint rapporteurs to investigate the human rights conditions of Ethiopians in Eritrea and of Eritreans in Ethiopia. The Eritrean Government and its representatives have, at the same time, persistently requested their Ethiopian counterparts to join them in extending similar invitations. The request had always been ignored. It is therefore good news that the Ethiopian Parliament has invited the relevant UN Mechanisms to appoint a Special Rapporteur. It is welcomed by the Eritrean Government if the Special Rapporteur's mandate will also include the investigation of the violations of the human rights of Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin in Ethiopia since 1998.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Asmara
16 June 2000

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Letter dated 16 June 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith a statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia related to the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia dated 15 June 2000 (see annex).

May I request your kind assistance in having the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Peter **Chkheidze**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

00-48659 (E) 190600

Annex to the letter dated 16 June 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia is concerned by the intensified violence in Abkhazia, Georgia, which has already turned into a well established sequence of deliberate acts. The Abkhaz regime has not been sparing in efforts aimed at legalizing the forcibly changed demographic situation as a consequence of the ethnic cleansing, and creating unbearable living conditions for the Georgian returnees in the Gali district. Moreover, threats to repeat the Gali events of May 1998 have become a common denominator of the developments in the region.

Once again we have to state that the violence that has erupted in the Gali district is a logical outgrowth of the escalating situation of gross violations of the rights of the peaceful population by the Abkhaz regime, abetting the smuggling of arms and drugs. In this context, the issue of prevention of the flow of arms into the conflict zone remains at the top of the agenda. The basis for consolidating the efforts of the international community in this respect is derived from Security Council resolution 876 (1993). The critical nature of the situation in the zone of conflict is manifested in systematic and gross violations of the rights of the peaceful population by the Abkhaz side, including robberies on ethnic and gender grounds, violations of property rights, demands for "residence permits" from the returnees and their harassment, as noted in the report of the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council on 24 April 2000 (S/2000/345). Abolishing instruction in their native language for the Georgian population has elements of the crime of genocide under international law.

The refusal to cooperate with the representatives appointed by the Georgian side to the Joint Investigation Group serves as another litmus test, revealing violations of the obligations of the Abkhaz regime under the peace process. This case renders self-evident the responsibility of the Abkhaz side in the deterioration of the security situation in the zone of conflict.

Facing these challenges, the Government of Georgia declares that it will make all efforts to promote security in the zone of conflict and achieve a comprehensive resolution of the conflict in Abkhazia, Georgia. In this respect, we attach great importance to the document on the distribution of constitutional competencies between the central authorities of Georgia and the authorities of Abkhazia, Georgia, drafted by the United Nations and the group of Friends of the Secretary-General. The programme of economic rehabilitation of the region produced by the United Nations Development Programme is equally important for the settlement of the conflict. The implementation of the programme will start as soon as the political status of Abkhazia within Georgia is determined.

The Government of Georgia reaffirms the unacceptability of any act of violence directed at undermining the process of peaceful resolution. We condemn the tensions in the zone of conflict stemming from the failure of the Abkhaz side to meet its obligations under the peace process and the Security Council resolutions. As a result the refugees and internally displaced persons from Abkhazia, Georgia,

are still deprived of their fundamental right of unconditional and safe return to their homes.

The Government of Georgia calls on the Secretary-General, his Special Representative, the Security Council, the States members of the group of Friends of the Secretary-General, the Russian Federation as facilitator and the specialized agencies of the United Nations to intensify their efforts in Gali district for the purpose of ensuring security as well as full implementation of the Security Council resolutions.

Tbilisi
15 June 2000

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Letter dated 15 June 2000 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have been instructed by my Government to transmit its views on your report of 6 June 2000 on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) (S/2000/538).

Notwithstanding its scope and volume, the report makes no mention in any of its sections of the principal provisions of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999 regarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (tenth preambular paragraph and para. 8 of annex 2);

Four overriding tendencies characterize the concept of the report:

(a) Selectivity, reflected in the selection of "successes" achieved by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo and in the implementation of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999);

(b) Bias in the appraisal of the situation in Kosovo and Metohija, in particular of the security situation, whereby security for the Albanian population is accentuated and the lack of it for the Serbian population is marginalized;

(c) Generalization of the problems facing the Serbian population;

(d) Absence of criticism and condemnation of those responsible for the violence against the remaining Serbs and other non-Albanians;

The report obfuscates the true situation in Kosovo and Metohija; its many details serve to create an impression of a complex process of stabilization and to cover up the failure to implement Security Council resolution 1244 (1999);

Attacks and other forms of violence which "appear to be orchestrated" against Kosovo and Metohija Serbs are dealt with in paragraphs 21, 22 and 23. Yet the perpetrators are not condemned and called to account, while the responsibility of ethnic Albanian leaders is not highlighted. No mention is made of the failure of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and UNMIK to provide a secure environment;

The question of the situation in southern Serbia is raised in paragraph 24 without authority. It is apparently aimed at projecting a picture of an alleged

00-48665 (E) 190600

threat to Kosovo and Metohija by Serbia. A new subject, the so-called Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac (UCPMB), is introduced as "an armed ethnic Albanian group", and not as a terrorist organization, engaged in "occasional armed clashes with Yugoslav security forces". In the context, the question is also raised, without authority, of finding a political solution for the part of the sovereign territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its constituent Republic of Serbia;

The question of missing persons and detainees is raised in paragraphs 53 and 124 (section XI, Observations), accentuating the issue of Albanians detained in Serbia proper. The calling upon Member States to contribute to their release is an invitation to interfere directly in the internal affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and to exert pressure upon the legal and judicial systems of its constituent Republic of Serbia. Conversely, no mention is made of the existence of labour camps in which ethnic Albanian terrorists detain the Serbs of which the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia informed the Security Council and the Secretary-General in its memoranda of 4 April 2000 and 7 June 2000. Also, UNMIK has kept in detention without a legal basis over 450 Serbs and has prevented the International Committee of the Red Cross or any other non-governmental organization from visiting any of over 940 Serbs and other non-Albanians abducted since the deployment of KFOR and UNMIK;

The question of mass graves is raised again in paragraph 55 with the invocation of large numbers, but without firm evidence to corroborate the claims;

The multi-ethnic concept of Kosovo and Metohija propounded in the report has been all but abandoned, which is particularly evident in the establishment of the judicial system in Kosovo and Metohija (para. 57). In that context, particularly dangerous are the preparations for the establishment of "a Kosovo war and ethnic crimes court" which in effect constitutes a new threat to the remaining Serbs (para. 60);

Scant attention has been accorded to the return of over 350,000 Serbs and other non-Albanians and, in that context, to the fact that KFOR and UNMIK have not fulfilled their obligation to create conditions for their safe return, which is of paramount importance for the forthcoming elections in Kosovo and Metohija;

Contrary to the contention in the report, the terrorist so-called Kosovo Liberation Army has not been demilitarized; instead, it metamorphosed into the armed wing of the ethnic Albanian narco-mafia, while the so-called Kosovo Protection Corps continues to terrorize and ethnically cleanse the Serbs and other non-Albanians in the presence of KFOR and UNMIK.

I take this opportunity to advise that UNMIK and KFOR have failed to carry out some of their main responsibilities provided by Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) and the Military Technical Agreement:

- Establishing a secure environment (para. 9 (c));
- Ensuring public safety and order (para. 9 (d));

- Conducting border monitoring duties (para. 9 (g)); and consequent failure to secure and control the international borders of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with Albania and Macedonia;

- Protecting and promoting human rights, in particular of Serbs and other non-Albanians (para. 11 (j));

- Permitting a number of Yugoslav and Serb military and police personnel to return to Kosovo and Metohija (para. 4, paras. 6 and 10 of annex 2, and para. 4 of the Military Technical Agreement).

In addition, your Special Representative in Kosovo and Metohija and Head of UNMIK continues to take decisions and publish regulations which increasingly detach Kosovo and Metohija from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its constituent Republic of Serbia of which it is an integral part, in violation of the letter and spirit of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) and the relevant documents.

It should be emphasized that the systematic violations of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), pointed out also by the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation, permanent members of the Security Council, and by some other States Members of the United Nations, of which no mention is made in the report, are detrimental to the initiation of the political process for the solution of the status of Kosovo and Metohija within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its constituent Republic of Serbia (para. 11 (a)).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Vladislav **Jovanovic**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

United Nations S/2000/596

Security Council

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Letter dated 15 June 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Uganda to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On instructions of my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith a statement detailing the chronology of events and the repeated violations of the ceasefire in Kisangani by the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) (see annex). The Government of Uganda totally rejects the allegations levelled at the Ugandan People's Defence Forces (UPDF) and wishes to assure the international community of its commitment to the Lusaka peace process.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex published as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Prof. Semakula **Kiwanuka** Ph.D.
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of Uganda to the United Nations

00-48566 (E) 200600

Annex to the letter dated 15 June 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Uganda to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Kisangani clashes

Introduction

1. Uganda's stated position on Congo has always been that the Congo question has two dimensions, namely:

(a) The legitimate security concerns of the neighbours of Congo;

(b) The internal Congolese crisis.

2. The security concerns of neighbours can be best resolved by both the Congolese and the region, supported by the international community, and it is for this reason that we worked for and still support Lusaka.

3. The internal Congolese questions is to be resolved by the Congolese themselves also within the framework of Lusaka.

Issue of repeated clashes between UPDF and RPA in Kisangani

4. UPDF and RPA have clashed three times in Kisangani: in August 1999, in May 2000 and in June 2000. The underlying causes of these unjustified and unfortunate clashes are outlined below.

Kisangani I

5. The causes of Kisangani I can be traced to the following:

(a) There was a split in the rebellion (Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD)) in May 1999 which effectively resulted in the creation of two RCDs: RCD Kisangani, supported by Uganda, and RCD (Goma), supported by Rwanda;

(b) This split even translated into the question of who was to append signature to the Lusaka Agreement on behalf of RCD. The Governments signed the Agreement on 10 July 1999, while the leaders of the rebellion signed much later, at the end of August, owing to the disagreements cited above;

(c) Kisangani I was a clear attempt by RPA and its RCD (Goma) allies to stop the verification process sanctioned by the region to establish whether RCD Kisangani existed independent of RCD (Goma) with separate political and military structures, and political support/following in the liberated territories;

(d) Therefore, the attack on UPDF by RPA was a clear indication of the level of commitment of either the Army or the Government to Lusaka, that is Uganda/UPDF was strongly committed to Lusaka and its implementation, while Rwanda/RPA was not and would do anything to obstruct it;

(e) The causes of Kisangani I were not conclusively resolved because of RPA disinterest in further thorough investigations, claiming that the inconclusive, preliminary Jeje-Kayumba report was satisfactory;

(f) UPDF, however, maintained that this report was inconclusive and required to be revisited because some key people had not been interviewed by the committee, such as Presidents Museveni and Kagame, Minister Zuma of South Africa, Minister Silwamba of Zambia, Minister Mazimpaka of Rwanda, Hon. Otafire, the late Lt. Col. Ikondere and civilians who witnessed what took place during Kisangani I and whose testimony would have been material to the conclusions;

(g) That notwithstanding, the leadership of both countries agreed in Mweya to sectorize Kisangani into two zones corresponding to the operational areas of both armies: UPDF was to be in charge of the north and east of Kisangani, while RPA was to control the south and west of Kisangani.

Kisangani II

6. Kisangani II arose out of the desire of RPA to take Kapalata, which, however, lay within the UPDF area of control, as per the sectorization agreement.

7. RPA started its schemes by instigating their protégé RCD (Goma) to clamour for the removal of UPDF from Kapalata, claiming that it used to be a training camp for the police and UPDF dispositions at Kapalata and Lubutu-Bwafwasende junction on 5 May 2000 which were successfully repulsed by UPDF.

8. The leaders of both Uganda and Rwanda and the United Nations Security Council delegation led by Richard Holbrooke agreed to a ceasefire and demilitarization of Kisangani on 8 May 2000 at Rwakitura.

9. This was followed by the Mwanza talks of 14 May 2000 between the Presidents of Rwanda and Uganda, who also agreed on demilitarization. The force commanders of both armies made a joint statement on 15 May 2000 to give effect to the resolution of demilitarization. An execution order was also signed by the two force commanders in Kigali on 21 May 2000 to implement the demilitarization.

10. It was agreed that the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) should deploy its officers to effect the demilitarization and Kisangani was zoned for purposes of demilitarization, which was to be in phases.

11. Kisangani II therefore boils down to attempts by RPA to take Kapalata, Lubutu-Bwafwasende junction and Bangoka Airport.

12. RPA even reinforced their company at Bangoka Airport to battalion strength and assaulted the UPDF company at Bangoka three times without success.

Hurdles during demilitarization in the aftermath of Kisangani II and causes of Kisangani III

13. Two UPDF officers and four supporting staff who were supposed to be part of the Joint Command Centre (JCC) in Kisangani in keeping with the execution order reported late for reasons beyond their control or that of UPDF.

14. The airports in Kisangani had been unilaterally declared out of use by RPA except for United Nations planes. This compelled UPDF to re-route its officers for JCC through Buta and then by road to Kisangani, which resulted in their delay.

15. UPDF forces from La-Forestierre and Bangoka Airport were to withdraw to Bafwasende according to the execution order, while the RPA forces at Bangoka Airport and Lubutu-Bafwasende junction were to withdraw to Lubutu.

16. UPDF requested to move part of its equipment and personnel from Bangoka Airport and La-Forestierre to Banalia instead of Bafwasende, which was accepted by both MONUC and RPA.

17. The rest of the equipment and personnel were moved to Bafwasende as per the execution order.

18. Intermediate withdraw positions at Wanyarukula and Bengamisa were agreed upon between UPDF and RPA with the approval of MONUC.

19. RPA, however, subsequently circumvented this and withdrew just 24 km from Kisangani-Lubutu road.

20. Consequently, MONUC and UPDF received threats from RPA that it would return its equipment and personnel to Bangoka Airport and Lubutu-Bwafwasende junction because UPDF had not met the 0630 hrs deadline to move owing to unforeseen technical problems reported to and accepted by MONUC and JCC.

21. The UPDF, however, complied with and completed its phase I withdrawal obligations in accordance with the execution order.

22. In phase II, UPDF was to withdraw from La Camp Kapalata to Banalia, while RPA was to withdraw from Kisangani city and Sim Sim Airport to Ubundu.

23. Before commencement of phase II, the RPA made unreasonable demands that UPDF should withdraw first and at night, which were unacceptable to UPDF but consistent with the treachery of RPA.

24. In the morning of 5 June 2000, the UPDF communicated to MONUC its readiness to deploy the force that was to form part of the joint deployment in Kisangani and Kapalata.

25. The RPA, however, hit a UPDF vehicle which was coming from Bangoka Airport, where it had taken supplies to UPDF troops the same day.

26. The UPDF position at Kapalata also came under attack. All this forced UPDF to take self-defence measures, including the securing of Tshopo Bridge and establishment of a defence at Sotexki junction.

27. RPA continued shelling and making futile attacks on these UPDF dispositions, and destroyed the power station on Tshopo River from tactical bases they had established amid civil built-up areas.

28. Uganda remains committed to the Lusaka Peace Accord and subsequent agreements because the two dimensions to the conflict are adequately answered within the framework of Lusaka, that is, the internal question and the security concerns of neighbours.

29. The full implementation of the Agreement has, however, mainly been bogged down by lack of resources. The convening of the national dialogue had also been delayed owing to disagreement over the choice of the facilitator, which fortunately was resolved with the appointment of His Excellency Sir Ketumire Masire in January 2000.

30. The Joint Military Commission (JMC) is constrained by lack of funds and it observed as much at its meeting held on 8 and 9 June 2000 in Lusaka.

31. It has, however, along with MONUC, worked out a plan which was adopted by the Political Committee for the disengagement and redeployment of forces in Congo, let alone presenting a draft proposal for the disarmament, demobilization, resettlement, and reintegration process which the Political Committee is to consider.

32. JMC has also deployed its officers in Boende, Kabinda, Lisala and Kabalo.

33. Therefore, with the support of the international community and the parties to the conflict, implementation of the ceasefire agreement will be seriously undertaken and accomplished.